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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RONALD RALPH OLSEN by his
Guardian Ad Litem, Ralph E. Olsen,
Plaintiff and Appella.nt,
-vs.SHELDON T. W ARWOOD, BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF THE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a
Body Corporate; CLIF'TON R.
CLARK, CLARENCE D. ASHTON, VICTOR C. ANDERSON,
THOMAS P 0 WE·R S-, and
THOMAS A. BARRATT, Members
of the Board of Education of the
Alpine School District, a Body Corporate,
·
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 7789

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF CASE
The different versions of the evidence in this case
may best be outlined in that part of the brief dealing with
the arguments to which they apply. Therefore, the defendants and respondents will not at this time review the
evidence except to state that the jurys' finding in favor of
1
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the defendants in this case requires that conflicts in the
evidence be resolved in defendants' favor and the evidence be considered in the light most favorable to the
defendants.
The appellant seeks a reversal of this case upon four
grounds, all of which go to the giving or refusal of the
court to give certain instruction. It is the purpose of ·
this brief to demonstrate the correctness of the court's
action, the converse of appellant's position, and in doing
so we will accept the breakdown of the appellant's brief
and deal with the argument as follows:

POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY· REFUSED PLAINTIFF'S .REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER ONE AND
CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7 (TRANSCRIPT 223) TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF JURORS
MUST AGREE UPON THE SAME NEGLIGENT ·ACT OR
ACTS OR OMISSIONS IN ORDER TO RETURN A VERDICT
IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR.

POINT THREE
THE EVIDENCE WARRANTED THE COURT'S GIVING
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 9 (TRANSCRIPT 224) TO THE
EFFECT THAT IF THE JURY SHOULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF RAN TOWARD THE BUS AT A TIME AND IN A
PLACE WHERE DEFENDANT COULD NOT SEE HIM
THEY SHOU'LD RETURN A VERDICT· IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT IF THEY FURTHER FOUND PLAINTIFF
DID NOT EXPECT SUCH ACTION AND ACTED AS A
REASONABL~ AND PRUDENT PERSON UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES.

2
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POINT FOUR
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11 (TRANSCRIPT 226) IS
NEITHER ARGUMENTATIVE NOR DOES IT COMMENT
UPON THE WEIGHT WHICH THE JURY SHOULD GIVE
TO THE EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 AND CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DEFENDANTS' DUTY.

In Point One of the argument plaintiff cites as error
the refusal of the trial court to give his requested instructions to the effect that it was the duty of the defendant to exercise a high degree of care to enable the
plaintiff to alight and get from the bus in safety and that
the degtee of care required is such as a very pr~de:p. t,
careful and competent person would exercise under similar circum tances.
The argument then goes on to cite a number of authorities all of which admittedly define the standard of
care required of ·a common carrier and concludes with
the argument that, irrespective of whether or not a school····
bus is a common carrier, the operator of a. school bus
should exercise a high degree of care for its passengers. The fallacy of the argument is three-fold; first,
the defendant, school district, and the operator of the bus
was not a common carrier; second, the court in its
instructions to the jury properly instructed the jury upon
the higher duty which would be owed to children of' a
tender age; and third, plaintiff's requested instruction
added nothing to those given by the court.

3
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A. The Driver of a School Bus is not a Common
Carrier.
A public or common carrier is defined: "A public
or common carrier of passengers is one which, as a regular business, undertakes for hire to carry all persons,
within certain limitations, who may appy for passage,
and holds itself out as engaged in such business." 13 CJS
Section 530 page 1034.

"A 'Common Motor Carrier of Passengers' means
any person who holds himself o·ut to the public as willing
to undertake for hire to transport by motor vehicle from
place to place, persons who Inay choose to employ him."
76-5-13, Utah Code Annotated as amended.
As contradistinguished from this, ''A private carrier
of passengers is one who, without being engaged in such
business as a public employment, undertakes to deliver
passengers for hire or reward or even gratuitously." 13
c~JS Section 531, Page 1036.
By statute "Contract Motor Carrier of Passengers
means any person engaged in the transportation by motor
vehicle of persons for hire, and not included in the term,
motor carrier of passengers as hereinbefore defined." 76.;.
5-13, Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
The distinguishing feature between the two callings
is not that .passengers are carried for hire, since this is
true in either case, but that a common carrier is engaged
in and holds itself out as engaged in the business of carrying passengers. to any person or part of the public who
may choose to employ it whereas this element is missing
in the case of a private carrier.
4
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In ~tate Y. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, a person who operated an automobile on1nibus pursuant to contract with a
ca1nping association, in ''"'llich he transported exclusively
guests or prospectiYe guests of the association, and their
baggage, for an agreed daily wage, was held not to be
a comn1on or public carrier.
In this case defendant did not hold himself out as
engaged in the business of a common carrier of passengers but rather transported students to and from
school by reason of a private contr~ct for a definite
wage between him and the school district to carry only
a very lin1ited and predetermined group, that is, school
students. (Tr. 127 -128) There is no authority cited in
which the operator of a school bus has been defined as
and held to the standard of care ·required of a common
carrier. On the other hand, there are a number of cases
"\vhich have held. the operator of a school bus is a private
carrier and that ordinary prudence for the safety of children under similar circumstances is all that is required.
In the case of Shannon et al v. Central-Gaitor Union
School District et al, a California case, 23 P2d 769, cited
in appellant's brief, an action against a school district
for injuries to a child of ten and one-half years who was
injured while leaving a school bus and crossing a road,
the court said:
"We are of the opinion that a bus which is operated only for the convenience of a particular
school under the circumstances of. this case is a
mere private carrier as distinguished from a common carrier, and that the ordinary prudence for
the safety of children under similar circumstances
5
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is all that is required of the district
of the bus."

~r

the driver

This case was followed in Foster v. Einer (Calif.) 158
P2d 978.
In the case of Gaudette v. McGlauklin (New Hampshire) 189 Atlantic 872, 88 NH 368, an action against
the driver of a bus for the death of a school child which
was struck by an automobile after alighting from a bus
and while crossing the h~ghway the court said:
"The plaintiff's exception to the failure of the
court to charge that 'a carrier of passengers is
bound to exercise the highest degree of care and
diligence,' is without merit. Even a common carrier is not held to such a high standard and the defendant here was only a private carrier. As such,
ordinary car"e under all the circumstances was all
that was required of him."
. In the case of Archuleta v. Jacobs, 94 P2d 706 a
New Mexico case, an action was brought for the wrongful death of a child who was struck by an automobile
after alighting from a school bus. The trial court had instructed the jury as follo~s: "And in connection with
these definitions you are instructed that the driver of a
school bus transporting children of tender age owes
to them the greatest degree of care for their safety, and
such course of conduct should extend from the time the
children board such bus, and during their transportation
to their destination, and including the alighting therefrom by such children under circumstances to insure their
safety and leaving the immediate scene of the bus stop.
" The appellate court held:
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,., \ '7

e rannot esea pe the conclusion that this
instruction of the court cast upon defendant an
undue burden, and that this constitutes reversible
error. It eannot be said that the law may apply
to the conduct of the plaintiff's deceased the rule
of 'ordinary care' only, and then say, as was said
in substance, in these instructions, that as to defendant, his conduct 1nust be such that everything
'possible to be done' must be done by him to avoid
injury to the deceased, if he is to escape liability."
B. The Court Correctly Instructed the Jury on the
Duty Owed to Children.

There is no question that the operator of a school
bus owes a greater or higher duty of care to children of a
tender age than would he. owe to adults under similar
circumstances. The standard of care ·of a reasonable
and prudent person is a variable factor depending upon
the circumstances of each case. As is said in Archuleta
v. Jacobs, cited above:
"Of course we know that the amount or degree
of diligence and caution _which is necessary to constitute due, reasonable or ordinary care changes
with changing conditions, and we find wide variations according as circumstances in some instances
require greater vigilance and caution than in
others (Citations) and yet the law has found the
foregoing and universally approved definitions
sufficiently flexible and reliable for use as a guide
in all such cases."
"It is also true, of cour-se, that the age of a
child and its ability to look out for itself and capacity to appreciate danger are always a proper
matter for consideration for determining whether
proper care has been exercised as to such child.

7
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Conduct that might easily qualify as ordinarilyand prudent care as to a child of one age, and with
capacity to understand and appreciate danger,
might easily fall short of such classification with
reference to a child of more tender years .and of
less ·understanding and appreciation of danger.
(Citations given) And yet, we still measure the
care required by the one standard, viz., 'What
would a reasonably prudent man do under like
circumstancesf"
As was said in Cartright v. Graves, 184 SW 2nd 373,
in which a child was not quite six years of age:
"That the age of a child and his consequent
ability or lack of ability to look after her own
safety after alighting from the bus is, as declared
as a court of appeals; 'the dominant factor.'"
The court quoting from Townsley v. Yellow Cab Company, 145 Tennessee 91, 237 SW 58, went on to say:
"Years ago in Wheeley v. Whitman, one Head
( 610), 38 Tenn. 610, this court expressly approved
Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213, 54 Am. Dec. 67, to
th~ effect that children of tender age are entitled
to a degree of care from others proportioned to ·
their ability to forsee and avoid the perils which
they may encounter, and holding t.hat-'What
would be but ordinary neglect in regard to one
whom the defendants ·supposed a person of full
age and capacity, would be gross I}eglect as to a
child, or one known to be incapable of escaping
danger.'"
In the present case the court gave three instructions
defining the standard which the jury should apply in determining the duty of the defendant in regard· to the
plaintiff. In Instruction No. 9 (Tr. 225) the jury was in-

8
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strueted that the defendant \vas required to use such care
as a reasonable and prudent person would use under like
conditions a,nd circunudances. In Instruction No. 4 (Tr.
221) negligence 'vas defined as the doing of some act
\Yhich reasonable and prudent person having due regard
for th.e surro undin.g circ~unstances would not do or the
failure to do some act \vhich a reasonable and prudent
person having a regard for all the surro.unding circum.stances would do. It \vas further defined as failure to
use that degree of care which a reasonable and p-rudent
person in like or similar circumstances would use.· In
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 222) the jury was instructed that
in determining whether or not the defendant used reasonable care they should take into consideration the number
and ·ages of his passengers, the type of a vehicle he wa.s
operating, the place at which and the position in which he
stopped the vehicle, the conditions of the· weather, the
conditions of the surface of the ground on which plaintiff
alighted from_ the bus, and any a;nd all facts and circumstances shown by the evidence e.ffecting the care w·hich
reasonable and prudent person under like conditions
would use.
It is submitted that the jury were properly instructed
as to the standard which they should apply in determining the duty of the defendant toward the plaintiff and the
elements, including the tender age of the plaintiff, which
they .should take into consideration in defining that duty.
C. The Instruction Requested by Defendant if not
:Improper would add nothing to the Instruction given by
Court.

a
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The phrase "high degree of care," or "highest degree
of care," or any similar expressions, as contended for in
counsel's brief, mean nothing more than "the care ~hat an
ordinarily prudent person .would exercise under all the
facts and circumstances."
"The test of care is not whether in degree it
should be slight or ordinary or extreme care, but
commensurate care, due care under the. circumstances."
Catesv~

Hall, (N.C.) 88 S.E. 524;

Fitzgerald v. R. R. Co., (N.C.) 54 S. E. 91.
. "The law of negligence is not based upon the
highest degree of care which a highly .prudent
person would use, but on the average· reasonable
care-the degree of care that twelve men selected
at random from the vicenage, will say is reasonable under all the circumstances."
Spanknebel v. R.R. Co., 111 N.Y.S. 705, 707.
In Union Traction Co. v. Berry, (Ind.) 121 N. E. 655,
the court gives a very clear exposition of the principles
with respect to the standard of care in negligence cases.
To quote:
"As bearing on the· issue of negligence the
court gave the following instruction: 'If you find
from the evidence in this case that on and about
the 23rd day of May, 1914, the defendant was a
common carrier of passengers, then I instruct
you that it was held to the highest degree of care
and diligence for the safety of passengers· consistent with the mode of conveyance employed, and
that the omission of the defendant to exercise
the highest degree of practicable care constituted
negligence on its· part.'"

10
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·'By the first part of this instruction, preceding the conjunction ~and,' the court undertakes
to define the duty 'Yhich the la'v i1nposes on appellant as a carrier of passengers, and by the latter
part the court atten1pts to direct the jury. as to the
application of the rule to the case on trial. Objection is made to this instruction on the ground
that it inYades the province of the jury, the objection being specifically directed to the latter
part~ but this part is so closely connected in meaning with what precedes it as to require a consideration of the instruction as a whole. By this in.:.
struction the court told the jury, in substance, that
the law imposed a different and a higher duty on
carriers of passengers with reference to the exercise of care than rested on persons or corporations
sustaining other relations involving the exercise
of care."
"In the case of Bedford, S. 0. & B. R. Co. v.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 277, the
court said: 'The rule that there may be degrees
of negligence has long ago been discarded in this
state, and, when it is said that an occurrence· came
about through the slight negligence or gross negligence of another, it is, in either case, nothing more
than saying that such person was negligent.' "
"Negligence is the neglect or violation of the
duty to use care. If there can be no degrees of
negligence, it must follow that there can be no
degrees of duty. Duty is an absolute term. The
law requires nothing more than duty; it will excuse nothing less. The duty to exercise care for
the safety of another arises as a matter of law out
of some relation existing between the parties, and
it is, the province· of the court to determine whether
such a relation is shown as. gives rise to such
duty.. In determining whether the-relation shown

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gives rise to a duty to use care, the court decides
a pure question of law. This question cannot be
submitted to a jury. Where a duty to exercise care
exists, it is always the same, regardless of the nature of the -relation out of which it ari~es. It cannot be said that the duty to use care which arises
out of the court to carrier and passenger differs
in kind, character, or degree from the duty which
arises out of the relation of master and se-rvant,
or out of any other relation which imposes the
legal duty to use care.
"In submitting the determination to a jury
of a question of negligence, which is a mixed question of law and fact, the court is required to define
the duty which the law imposes. This duty is defined by the law as 'due care,' 'ordinary care,' or
'reasonable care,' which terms are regarded by
the courts as having the same ·significance. It is
als·o the duty of the court to state the rule fixing .
the standard of care which will measure up to the
duty imposed by law~ The court should then leave
it to the jury to decide whether the acts and conduct of the defendant in respect to the matter before the court measures up to the standards of
care fixed by the law. In defining the duty and
fixing the standard of care by which the jury is
to measure the conduct of the defendant, the court
does not consider the facts of the particular case.
The duty is the same under all relations, and the
standard of care which will measure up to the
duty in all cases is such care as a person of reasonable or ordinary prudence would exercise in
view of all the conditions and circumstances as
disclosed by the evidence in the particular case.
It is for the jury to consider the conditions and
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, in deter. mining. what action should have been taken .or
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avoided, what precautions should have been employed, and what course of conduct should have
been pursued in order to measure up to the duty
of 'due care' which the law imposes. In determining this fact the jury applies the standard furnished by the court, which is, What would a person
of ordinary prudence have regarded as reasonably
necessary or proper under the circumstances~"

• • • •

"The use of such terms as 'slight care,' 'great
care,' ~highest degree of care,' or other like expressions, in instructions, as indicating the quantum
of care the law exacts under special conditions and
circumstances, is misleading; and when so used
they constitute an invasion of the province of the
jury, whose function it is to determine what
amount of care is required to measure up to the
duty imposed by law under the facts of the par~
ticular case. The law imposes but one duty in
such cases, and that is the duty to use due care;
and the law recognizes only one standard by which
the quantum of care can be measured, and that is
the care ·which a person of ordinary prudence
'vould exercise under like circumstances."
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE REQUIRED
NUMBER OF JURORS MUST AGREE UPON THE SAME
NEGLIGENT ACT OR ACTS OR OMISSIONS TO ACT IN
ORDER TO RETURN A VERDICT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR.

In Point Two of the argument the appellant objects
to the court's instruction No. 7 (Tr. 224) wherein the
court instructed the jury that the required number of
jurors must agree upon the same negligent act or acts
or upon the same failure to act but that it is not necessary
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that plaintiff prove that the defendant was negligent in
each and all of the respects charged in plaintiff's answers
to defendant's interrogatories and that it is sufficient if
the defendant was negligent in any one or more o~ such
particulars. Appellant asserts that if three of the jury
concurred'that the defendant was negligent because he did
not give the plaintiff sufficient time to get off the bus and
two concurred that the defendant was negligent because
he stopped the bus too near the fence and snow and four
others concurred· that the _defendant was negligent for
some other reason, this would entitle the plaintiff to a
verdict providing the other ultimate facts were found in
plaintiff's favor. The appellant's illustration is unfortunate for the reason that in the example the required
number of· jurors actually concur on the same act or failure to act, that is, at least six or seven jurors do concur
on op_e common ground of negligence even though four
of the six or seven also concur on another ground of
negligence. However, we interpret appellant's argument
to be that if two jurors concur that defendant was negligent in one respect and three .concur that he was negligent in a different respect and four concur that he was
negligent in some respect different from the others this
would justify the jury in rendering a verdict for the
plaintiff.
This argument must fall under a logical e~amination
for the reason that it is based upon the false premise that
a concurrence of two· or three jurors that_ the defendant
was negligent in some particular constitutes a finding of
negligence. Actually, if only two jurors concur that the
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defendant \Yas negligent in son1e respect, such concurrence does not con~titute a finding of negligence but actually constitutes a. finding that the defendant was not
negligent since the remaining six of the eight jurors must
be presumed by their failure to concur to have believed
that the d~fendant \Yas not negligent in that respect.
'•It is established by a number of cases from
several jurisdictions that a failure of. the jury to
find as to the existence of essential facts or issues
the burden of establishing them, on the theory that
is equivalent to-a fip.ding against the party having
he failed to prove them, or that there was no evidence as to them." 76 ALR 1143.
By the same reasoning the failure of the required
number of the jurors to concur that the defendant was
negligent ill any particular respect constitutes a finding
by the jurors that the defendant was not negligent in
any respect.
vVhenever several acts ·of negligence are· charged
any ·one of which is sufficient as a basis for recovery, it is,
of course, necessary for the juror to find only that the defendant was negligent as to one of the acts charged but
there can be no finding if at least six jurors do not agree
that the defendant was negligent in some one respect ..
Under the appellant's theory it would be possible for the
jury to return a verdict against the defendant if three
should find he was negligent in allowing the child to
alight in some unsafe place and three others concurred
that he was negligent in starting the bus before the child
alighted although five jurors should believe that the de-
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· fendant was not negligent in allowing a child to alight
at an unsafe place and five jurors should believe that he
was not negligent in starting the bus up before the child
had alighted.
In Trinity and B. V. Railway Co. v. Geary, 172 South
West 545 (Texas) an action was brought to recover for
personal injuries. The claimed acts of negligence which
caused the injury were set up in separate counts and the
court submitted the case to the jury upon three counts of
negligence. The statute provided "no verdict shall be
rendered in any cause except upon the concurrence of all
1nembers of the jury trying the same." The jury found
plaintiff, Morris Geary, entitled to recover under his
first and third count and assessed his damages at $2000.00. The court said:
"Interpreted by the charge, the verdict clearly
expresses that a part of the jury found for the
plain tiff under the first ground, and a part under
the third ground. It is manifest that some of the
jury based their finding on the first, and some on
the third ground, but all did not agree on either.
There being no 'concurrence' of all the members
of the jury on either ground of negligence, the action of the District Court in receiving the verdict .
was in direct. disregard of the statute."
In Baker v. Allen (Colorado) 189 P4 a verdict finding defendant "guilty of mallice, fraud, or willful deceit
in committing the tort complained of," was held bad, being in the disjunctive; it being impossible to say therefrom whether defendant was guilty of fraud or willful
deceit or whether some of the jurors found him guilty of
one and others of the other offense.
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In the case of Barker v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.
(Kansas) 132 P156 an action brought to recover the dam.ages resulting from a fire originating from the defendant's railroad engine, the jury found that the fire did originate from the engine and the defendant requested the
court to question the jury as to whether the jury believed
the engine was lacking in proper equipment or whether
the fire .·originated from imprope-r operation of the
engine. The court refused to subn1it the questions to the
jury and this was held to be error by the court which
said:
"The defendant was entitled to a finding by
the jury as to whether the engine in question was
lacking in proper equipment, or whether the fire
originated from i1nproper operation of the engine
by those in charge. ·!1:any of the questions calling
for details touching insufficiency or mismanagement were properly refused. While the statute
makes the setting out of a fire caused by the operation of a road prima facia evidence of negligence,
still when the jury find that the fire originated
from the engine, they should be require4, upon request of the defendant, also to find whether it
was caused by insufficient equipment or improper
management."
"We cannot agree with the contention of
plaintiff's counsel that if half of the jurors believed the fire was caused by a defect in the engine
and the other half that it was caused by improper
operation, the plaintiff would still be entitled to
recover. If this were true there might be a concensus of opinion as to the l~ability of the defendant on twelve different basis on which such opinion could rest, each relied upon by only one of the
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jurors and none ~by all. Their unanimous opinion as to the essential facts of the case, as well
as to, the general results, must be in favor of the
prevailing party. The statutory right to have
proper questions submitted having been denied,
the defendant did not have the kind of trial it was
entitled to."
The cases cited by appellant are not in point for the
reason that they do not concern jury verdicts or there is
no showing that the jury did not agree on the issues necessary to support a verdict. In the absence of a showing
to the contrary, it must be presumed that a jury arriving
at a verdict followed the law and the p-roper procedure, in
doing so. Therefore, if there are two acts of negligence
charged, one which renders the defendant liable and one
which does not, the jury will be presumed to have found
the defendant negligent in the manner which would render him liable. Also where there are two counts of negli- ,
_ gence alleged, in the absence of a showing to the contrary,
a sufficient number of jurors to sustain a verdict must
be presumed to have found the issues which would support such a verdict, provided there is sufficient evidence
to support a verdict upon either or both grounds.

POINT THREE
THE EVIDENCE WARRANTED THE COURT'S GIVING
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 9 (Tr. 224) TO THE EFFECT
THAT IF THE JURY SHOULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF
RAN TOWARD THE BUS AT A TIME AND PLACE WHERE
THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT SEE HIM THEY SHOULD
RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT
IF THEY FURTHER FOUND PLAINTIFF DID NOT EX-'
PECT SUCH ACTION AND ACTED AS A REASONABLE
AND PRUDENT PERSON UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Appellant's argument and the authority cited by
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him in regard to this point is that there was no evidence
in the trial which would sustain the giving of such an
instruction.
This argument overlooks the testimony of Roland
Olsen (Tr. 74-75), wherein he testifi~d that he had been
guilty of bizzing, or grabbing hold of the back of the bus
and sliding along with it, on a previous occasion, nor does
it take into account the testimony .of Shirley Cluff (Tr.
190) that Ronald Olsen was running toward the bus at
the time of the accident in question here. Moreover, the
argument does not give the fair import to be testimony ·
of this defendant.
The testimony of the defendant was that the plaintiff
did alight on a sound and safe gravel shoulder. of the
road, not on, but away from the traveled portion of' the
highway (Tr. 138-139); that it was a perfectly safe place
for plaintiff to stand and remain until the bus should
move forward in its usual way. Defendant further testified that plaintiff was about five feet from the bus before
the driver put the bus in motion (Tr. 154-180). And that
apparently plaintiff was injured by coming into contact
with the rear wheel of the bus while the bus was in motion. It ce-rtainly could not be prejudicial error for the
court to use the words "ran towards the side of the bus
near the right wheel" if he actually "walked," when he
could not have been injured unless he did one or the other.
In either event his injury was due to an act of his own
volition. Whether he ran or walked into the bus is immaterial. If, therefore, the accident could not have happened except by his own act in making such a movement
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that he was struck by the bus, the jury had a perfect right
to infer or find from the evidence that the plaintiff was
injured by "running" into or "walking" into the side of
the bus near the right wheel. That is the only possible
deduction that can be arrived at from the established
fact that the boy was four or five feet away from the bus
when it resumed its motion and that he was injured by
contacting the bus near the right wheel.
The rule as stated in 64 C. J. page ~28 is stated as
follows:
"The propriety of an instruction that the jury
may draw reasonable and natural inferences from
the facts proved to their satisfaction, however, has
been recognized, and while there is authority to
the contrary, the view has been taken that the
court may properly charge that the jury may find
any fact proved which they think rightfully and
reasonably inferable from the evidence. Further
instructions suggesting to the jury inferences
which may be drawn from the evidence have been
upheld, and the view has been expressed that
where there is no dispute as to the immediate fact
testified to and the questiop is as to the effect of
such fact, it is not an inva~ion of the province of
the jury for the judge to point out to them the
different conclusions which 1nay be drawn and the
circumstances which may incline them to believe
the one or the other."
The authority cited in the text as contrary to this
rule is the case of Henry v. Colorado Land, etc. Co., 51
Pac. 90, but the instruction given in that case and which
was found to be objectionable, is altogether different from
the instruction here complained of, and the court in effect
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recognizes that in a proper case the principle for which
we contend may be applied. The following is the court's
statement:
HTo state generally that whenever evidence
is given the jury n1ay infer therefrom any fact
which they think reasonable is an inaccurate expression of the rule. The inference must of necessity flow from the fact and by a legitimate inference under the principles which govern the introduction of testimony. It is not every inference
which the jury may think deducible from the facts
which they have a right to take as a basis for their
verdict. This would leave the determination of
causes too much to conjecture and relieve them
from the yokes of the law which they are only too
willing to shake off and act on their own notions
of what is right and wrong regardless of the
proof."
The inference that the boy ran into the bus of necessity flows from proof that he was four or five feet away
from the bus after he had alighted and that he could
not have been injured unless he had of his own volition
run into it.·
In 53 Am. Jur. 458 it is said:
"It is not necessary that theTe be categorical
evidence as to a matter covered by an instruction,
it being sufficient if there is evidence of facts
from which the fact might b~ inferred."
And in 64 C. J. 783, it is said:
"The rule that an instruction should conform
to the evidence does not require that the instruc- ·
tion shall be supported by positive testimony always. It is sufficient if the assumed fact may be
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inferred reasonabfy
proved."

from

the

circumstances

. This case is no different in principle from Bryant
v. Bingham Stage Line, 60 Utah 299, 208 P. 541. To quote:
"There are certain physical facts that are not
in dispute: (1) Both the automobile and the street
cars were moving at the time of the collision at
rates of speed ranging from 8 to 20 miles an hour
-the exact rate is immaterial. ( 3) The fender of
the street car struck the right rear wheel of the
automobile while it was passing over the north
, track upon which the street car was moving. From
these facts alone the conclusion is irresistible that
the automobile was driving upon the track immediately in front of the moving street car. If it
had not .been driven upon the track immediately
in front of the moving street car the collision
could not have occured. Assuming that the automobile was moving only 8 miles an hour, which is
the lowest estimate made by any witness, it would
be moving a fraction more than 11 feet per second.
The automobile, in attempting to cross the track,
having been struck before it could get across, must
have been driven upon the track immediately in
front of the moving street car. We think, in view
of the uncontroverted physical facts, the trial
court was justified in assuming that the automobile was driven on the track immediately in front
of the moving street car."
The court clearly had a right to state in the instruction that the jury might find that the child contacted the
bus near the right wheel at a time and place where the
defendant could not see him, and also that they might
find that the defendant as a reasonable and prudent per22
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son did not expect such action on the part of the plaintiff. If there "'ere no testin1ony as to whether the driver
could or could not see the plaintiff contact the right side
of the bus near the rear wheel the court would be warranted in taking judicial notice that the driver of a bus
seated on the left front side could not see the part ·of the
bus near the rear right wheel.

POINT FOUR
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11 (TRANSCRIPT 226) IS
NEITHER ARGUMENTATIVE NOR DOES IT COMMENT
ON THE WEIGHT THE JURY SHOULD GIVE TO THE
EVIDENCE.

The instruction complained of reads :
"In weighing the evidence adduced in this
cause pertaining to the defendant's alleged negligence, it is your duty to consider it as you would
under all the facts and circumstances existing
at the tim.e of the accident, and not to consider it
as you would looking back upon the event from
this later date. Quite ordinarily, individual actions in any given set of circumstances may disclose faults and criticisms when looked back upon
· and tested by cool and deliberate thinking away
·from the event, which would not be apparent to a
reasonable and p:rudent person at the time he is
surrounded by the circumstances of the accident.
Thus the question is whether or not the defendant
at the time of the accident, and surrounded by all
of the circumstances shown by the evidence to
have surrounded him at such time, acted in all
respects as a reasonable and prudent person
would act. If he did so act, he was not negligent,
and therefore, he is not responsible for damages
resulting from the accident. But if he did not so
act in any.particular alleged in the pleadings then
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he was negligent, and is charged with all damages
proximately caused by such negligence."
It is correct that the judge should not invade the
province of the jury and decide questions of fact and the
weight which should be given to the evidence. The foregoing instruction does neither. No issues of fact are
found. in the instruction by inference and the jury are
not told what weight should be given. to any evidence.
They are merely told that in considering the evidence
they must "consider it as you would under all the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of the accident,
and not to consider it as· you would looking back upon
the event." This is a correct statement of the manner
in which the jury should consider the evidence:
"The test of actionable negligence is· what a reasonably prudent person, or a reasonably prudent and careful
one, would have done under the circumstances, before the
· accident, it is what a reasonably prudent and careful
person would have done under the circumstances in the
discharge of his duty to the injured person, or what a
reasonably prudent man would have done in the discharge
of his duty as they existed at the time of the accident,
and not what could or might have been done to have prevented a particular accident."
In Milasevich v. F'ox, Western Montana Theatre
Corporation, 165 P2d 195, it was held that the test of actionable negligence is not what might have prevented a
particular accident, but what reasonably prudent men
would have done in discharge of their duties under the
circumstances as they existed at time of accident. ·
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In nlaynard Y. City of Helena, 160 P2d 484 (Montana) an instruction that one suddenly put in danger
was not required impertively to do that which a~ter peril
\vas ended it \\'"as seen might have been done, and that
under such circun1stances a person would not be required
to exercise san1e judgment that an uninterested bystander
1night manifest, was proper.
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the ·defendant has failed to show
any prejudicial error in any of the court's instructions
and that no new trial should be awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
STE.WART, CANNON & HANSON
By REX J. HANSON
DON J. HANSON
Attorneys for Defendants

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

